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REPLY
A TWO-FRONT WAR
Saikrishna Prakasht
It seems I am fighting a two-front war, besieged by three superb
scholars. Professors Robert Delahunty and John Yoo, I and Professor
Michael Ramsey2 have authored bracing and challenging responses to
Unleashing the Dogs of War (Unleashing)." Though I have learned from
these essays, their authors might say that I have not learned enough
because I continue to adhere to the categorical theory's claim that any
decision to wage war on behalf of the United States is an exercise of
the Constitution's "declare war" power.4 Because under the Constitu-
tion only Congress may declare war, only Congress may decide
whether the United States will wage war.
I
THE FORMALIST THEORY
In Unleashing, I argue that in eighteenth-century America and Eu-
rope, the "declare war" power was understood in two senses. The nar-
row, formal sense referred to the power to issue formal declarations of
war. If a nation did not issue a formal declaration, it had not "de-
clared war" at all, however destructive its war making might be.5 Un-
leashing does not try to establish this meaning because Professor Yoo's
first-rate scholarship has clearly demonstrated that "declare war"
could be read in a narrow, formal sense. 6
t Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of San Diego. Yale Law School, J.D.;
Stanford University, B.A.
I Robert J. Delahunty &John Yoo, Response, Making War, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 123
(2007).
2 Michael D. Ramsey, Response, The President's Power to Respond to Attacks, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 169 (2007).
- Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by "Declare
War, "93 CORNELL L. REv. 45 (2007). In large measure, Unleashing responds to the excel-
lent war powers scholarship of Professors Yoo and Ramsey. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE
CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 218-49 (2007); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR
AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); Michael D. Ram-
sey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002);John C. Yoo, The Con tinua-
tion of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167,
246-47 (1996).
4 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 49-50, 52-54 (describing the categorical theory).
5 See id. at 46-47.
6 See Yoo, supra note 3, passim; Yoo, supra note 3, passim.
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Instead, Unleashing substantiates a broader, categorical reading of
the "declare war" power. In the eighteenth century, any decision to
wage war was seen as a declaration of war, whether that decision was
made in a formal declaration of war or was denoted by some hostile
action that signified a resolve to wage war. 7 For instance, one states-
man noted that "hostilities are commonly considered as the strongest
declaration of war"8 because general warfare made clear that a nation
had declared war, albeit in an informal way. Hence, an entity with the
"declare war" power was understood to have the power to declare war
formally and informally.
In Making War, Professors Delahunty and Yoo admit that in the
eighteenth century, people spoke of various hostile actions, such as
the commencement of warfare, as declarations of war.9 Further, they
agree that the "declare war" power was read to encompass all deci-
sions to go to war, including decisions to wage general hostilities.10
Yet they deny that the Constitution incorporated that broad reading;
instead, they contend that the Constitution employs the narrow, for-
mal definition of "declare war.""II
From this starting point, Professors Delahunty and Yoo draw
three conclusions. First, they claim that the "declare war" power only
grants Congress the power to issue formal declarations of war.' 2 Sec-
ond, they maintain that despite having the power to make formal dec-
larations, Congress cannot command the President to actually fight a
war.13 Third, they assert that the President can order uses of force
that would have been regarded as informal declarations of war be-
cause the President has all the executive power not granted to Con-
gress, and because the Constitution never grants Congress the powers
to wage war and make informal declarations.1 4 In Unleashing, I label
these propositions the "formalist theory" because the theory reads the
"declare war" power as only permitting Congress to issue formal decla-
rations of war and as granting no authority over informal declara-
tions.' 5 Making War is an important piece of scholarship because it
represents the latest and best explanation of the formalist theory of
"declare war."
7 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 53-54, 67-74.
8 1 JACQUES NECKER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER IN
GREAT STATES 273 (London, G.G.J. &J. Robinson 1792).
9 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 133, 136, 146.
10 See id. at 133, 136.
11 See id. at 124, 167.
12 See id. at 127, 166-67.
13 See id. at 129.
14 See id.
15 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 47.
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Besides making textual arguments found in Professor Yoo's ear-
lier scholarship,' 6 Making War begins by critiquing various textual
claims that I supposedly made in Unleashing. the attempt to place the
burden of proof on opponents; the assertion that "virtually all consti-
tutional provisions ... are indeterminate"; the contention that "any
reading is possible"; and the claim that "it is 'impossible' to arrive at a
textual interpretation of' the "declare war" power.' 7
Let me dispel any cloud of confusion. Unleashing is hardly some
sly deconstructionist attack on the determinacy of text. To the con-
trary, it makes rather ordinary textual arguments, most prominently,
asserting that the Constitution adopted the broader sense of "declare
war" that Making War admits existed in the eighteenth century.' This
is a claim about the meaning of text and not a claim that the Constitu-
tion is indeterminate or that "any reading is possible."' 19 Moreover,
rather than insisting that "it is 'impossible' to arrive at a textual inter-
pretation of' the "declare war" power,20 I argue in Unleashing that it is
"impossible to establish, from an examination of text alone, what 'de-
clare war' means" because the two senses of "declare war" are equally
plausible when looking at the text alone. 21 Finally, I disavow any at-
tempt, real or imagined, to foist a burden of proof on proponents of
the formalist theory. I am happy to have anyone consider the merits
of the various theories free from the burden of any lawyer's tricks. 22
Making War attempts to rebut a structural challenge that I issued
in Unleashing.23 Unleashing argues that the formalist theory renders
formal declarations so inconsequential that there is no reason to be-
lieve that the Founders would not have granted the entire "declare
war" power to the American executive, as it rested with the English
Crown.2 4 Indeed, if the formalist theory is correct and the President
may start a war on his own authority, the power to make formal decla-
ration (and the functions associated with formal declarations) could
have been safely and more sensibly lodged with the President.
16 Readers seeking a response to Making War's analysis of the provisions that bear on
the meaning of "declare war" should read Unleashing's textual section. See Prakash, supra
note 3, at 54-59.
17 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 126.
18 See id. at 133.
19 Id. at 126.
20 Id. at 125.
21 Prakash, supra note 3, at 54.
22 In truth, Unleashing differs little from Professor Yoo's work in this area. Professor
Yoo's previous scholarship never claimed that the Constitution's text, when read in isola-
tion, mandates the narrow reading of "declare war." Each work also examined history to
help establish the formalist theory.
23 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 129-33.
24 Prakash, supra note 3, at 62-65.
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In Making War, Professors Delahunty and Yoo respond to the
structural challenge by discussing the various functions of a formal
declaration of war. Only Congress could provide notice of the war,
propagandize by listing grievances against the enemy, set war aims, 2 5
regulate commerce, abrogate treaties, regulate enemy nationals,2 6 and
"clothe the bare state of general hostilities with appropriate legal char-
acteristics."2 7 I believe that Making War's functional discussion is accu-
rate. 28 Yet this list of functions hardly makes the power to issue formal
declarations consequential. Congress already enjoys power over some
of these functions, while others are trivial.
Consider the establishment of war aims. Making War claims that
the power to formally declare war includes the power to specify war
aims. 29 Yet if the President may wage war at will, as the formalist the-
ory avers, any war aims listed in a formal declaration are entirely su-
perfluous because they are not legally binding. For instance,
Congress might state in a formal declaration that "America fights this
war to safeguard its commerce." Nonetheless, under the formalist the-
ory, the President is free to acquire enemy territory or to secure re-
gime change, making the aims listed in the declaration irrelevant.
Moreover, the formalist theory maintains that Congress cannot com-
mand the President to fight a war.3 0 So Congress might declare war,
proclaim that war's aims, and yet the nation's military might fight no
war. In short, the ability to list empty war aims scarcely makes the
"declare war" power consequential. In fact, this discussion under-
scores that it would make far more sense to give the power to deter-
mine a war's aims to the President because under the formalist theory,
the President can meaningfully pursue those aims. After all, under
the formalist theory, the President has the sole power to decide to
wage war.
In another bid to grant formal declarations some real conse-
quences, Making War claims that in the late-eighteenth century, a for-
mal declaration was necessary to ensure that the laws of war applied.
Without a formal declaration, one had a "brute state of conflict" that
was "lawless and unregulated. '" 3 1 But Making War mistakenly supposes
that a formal declaration somehow had unique international law con-
sequences.3 2 About a decade before the Framers drafted the Constitu-
25 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 151-52.
26 See id. at 153, 155.
27 Id. at 152.
28 See Saikrishna Prakash, Declarations of War: A Primer 10-18 (Sept. 13, 2007) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author).
29 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 152.
"0 See id. at 128-29.
31 Id. at 150.
-2 See id. at 151-56.
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tion, England and France fought each other during the Revolutionary
War without either nation formally declaring war.3 3 Yet no one
thought that this war was a "brute state of conflict" or that it was "law-
less and unregulated." To the contrary, an English court concluded
that the laws of war applied because France and England had declared
war by the mouths of cannons. 34
While at one time it may have been true that formally declared
wars had different international law consequences for the warring na-
tions, by the time of the Constitution, it did not matter whether a
nation formally declared war or not.35 Proving this point, Making War
cites cases claiming that the Declaration of Independence regularized
hostilities..3 6 But if that informal declaration had this effect, why
should we assume that other informal declarations lacked the same
consequences? Informal declarations, no less than formal ones, indi-
cated that a sovereign had chosen to wage war. Where that was true,
the laws of war applied. Formal declarations were issued less fre-
quently in the late eighteenth century3 7 precisely because they did not
have unique capabilities, properties, or consequences.
Even so, assume that it was "necessary, or at least advisable"'3 to
formally declare war. Why not grant this power to the President?
What explains why the Framers would have granted Congress the sole
power to regularize warfare? The formalist theory awkwardly main-
tains that the President has the far-reaching power to wage war but
cannot explain why the President was not trusted to invoke the laws of
war. The President can start any number of lawless and unregulated
wars, but cannot ensure that the laws of war will protect the soldiers
and sailors who will wage them.
Making War disappoints by failing to discuss text found in all for-
mal declarations of war: the command to use force to wage war. Such
text made clear who acted with the sovereign's command, and it was
always distinct from the typical "declare war" language of formal decla-
rations.3 9 Making War admits that, because Congress has the "declare
33 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 49.
34 The Maria Magdalena, (1779) 165 Eng. Rep. 57, 58 (Adm.) (cited in Ramsey, supra
note 3, at 1585).
35 See Ramsey, supra note 3, at 1579-88.
36 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 152.
37 See THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 165 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
38 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 155.
39 See, e.g., King of Great Britain's Declaration of War Against the King of Spain, in 3
NAVAL AND MILITARY MEMOIRS OF GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1727 TO 1783, at 340, 341-42 (Rob-
ert Beatson ed., London, Longman, Hurst, Rees, & Orme 1804) [hereinafter NAVAL AND
MILITARY MEMOIRS] (reproducing England's declaration of war against Spain in which En-
gland ordered the use of military force); Spanish Declaration of War Against England, in 3
NAVAL AND MILITARY MEMOIRS OF GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1727 TO 1783, supra, at 342, 343
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war" power, Congress may exercise authority over all the other func-
tions found in formal declarations: propaganda, wartime commerce
rules, rules relating to resident aliens, treaty abrogation, etc. 40 But
Professors Delahunty and Yoo never explain why, out of all the func-
tions of a declaration of war, the power to command the military to
wage war does not rest with Congress. 41 If Congress enjoys the power
to issue declarations that contain all the traditional functions of a for-
mal declaration, this suggests that, contrary to the formalist theory,
Congress may order the waging of war. It further suggests that the Pres-
ident lacks the power to wage war because this power rests with Con-
gress. In Making War, Professors Delahunty and Yoo fail to consider
this feature of formal declarations, leaving their analysis incomplete, if
not inconsistent.
There remain the structural anomalies associated with the for-
malist theory. Making War asserts that the President can wage war and
that only Congress can formally declare war. These assertions envi-
sion strange allocations of power.
First, the formalist theory correctly supposes that the President
cannot exercise what the Constitution grants to Congress under the
"declare war" power. But consider what this principle means in prac-
tice for providing notice and stating grievances. The formalist theory
contemplates that the President may wage war against any nation but
may not announce the war to the world because this would infringe
on the congressional power of giving notice. The President certainly
cannot say that he or she has "declared war." Similarly, the President
cannot justify the war by discussing the enemy's belligerence because
such complaints might notify the world of the war. Thus, the Presi-
dent is in a rather curious position: the Commander in Chief may
start many wars but may not discuss any of them in public, lest the
President infringe on Congress's "declare war" power.
Second, suppose the President begins a war against Canada at a
time when Canadian nationals are given certain treaty rights, such as
the right to cross the border freely, and when Canada has most-fa-
vored-nation status. The formalist theory must imagine that these
rights could continue because Congress might not change them. At
(containing Spain's declaration of war against England in which Spain ordered the use of
military force).
40 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 151-55.
41 One cannot cite the Commander in Chief power as the answer, because Com-
manders in Chief did not have the power to wage war without authority from someone
else. As Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, George Washington certainly
could not elect to wage war against Russia or Sweden. Indeed, President Washington
agreed that he could not make war merely because he was Commander in Chief. See infra
text accompanying notes 47-49 (disclaiming his authority to wage war against the Creek
Indians because Congress had the "declare war" power).
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the very least, they would not change until Congress reconsidered
them, sometimes long after a President began the war. Hence we
could have Canadians freely crossing the border, and Canada would
retain its most-favored-nation status at the same time that we are at
war with Canada. In other nations, however, entities that could wage
war could command the use of military force and alter the treaty
rights of enemies because these entities also had the broader power to
declare war.
Third, consider the mirror situation. Suppose Congress declares
war, excoriates Canadian belligerence, orders Canadians to depart,
and bans commerce with Canada. Apparently, because Congress does
not have the power to command the use of military force, the Presi-
dent may order the troops to stay in the barracks and the navy in its
ports. We would be in the risible position of having declared war with
no prospect of fighting a war. And the President would have done
nothing wrong, because under the formalist theory, Congress can de-
clare war but cannot force the President to wage it.42
These possibilities reveal why it is unlikely that the Founders
would split the "declare war" power between two institutions, giving
the power to start a war to the President and the power to formally
declare war to Congress. Indeed, notwithstanding the edifying histori-
cal discussions found in Making War and its authors' prior scholarship,
none of these works cites any other constitution that mimics this divi-
sion of war powers.
One might say that the formalist theory is not formalist enough
because it unduly minimizes the significance of formal declarations.
Formal declarations were not important merely because they created
commercial rules or provided notice; they were vital documents pri-
marily because they could signal the onset of conflict. When issued at
a war's outset, a formal declaration credibly proclaimed that war
would ensue or had begun. By asserting that Congress can issue for-
mal declarations but cannot dictate that warfare ensues, the formalist
theory drains formal declarations of their most crucial feature.
Turning to American history, Making War observes that Un-
leashing does not show that the founding generation never used "de-
clare war" in a narrow, formal sense. 43 True enough. I fully accept
that "declare war" could be used in the formal sense, so much so that
Unleashing cites such use in certain American treaties, 44 coupled with
42 In Unleashing, I also observed that the formalist theory makes it impossible for Con-
gress to exercise two other traditional functions of a declaration: giving advanced notice of
warfare and issuing conditional declarations. See Prakash, supra note 3, at 59, 63. Making
War does not respond to these arguments.
43 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 158-66.
44 Prakash, supra note 3, at 83 n.196.
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more examples of the broader, categorical use in other treaties. 45 Yet
the question is not whether the Founders ever used "declare war" in
the narrow sense of that phrase, but whether the Constitution incorpo-
rates the formal or categorical definition.
To that end, Unleashing cites many Framers who, during the ratifi-
cation struggle, read the Constitution's "declare war" provision as au-
thorizing only Congress to take the nation to war. Some of these
statements are well-known and others are new discoveries. 46 In re-
sponse, Professors Delahunty and Yoo do not cite anyone from the
founding era who endorsed the formalist theory. Neither Federalists
nor Anti-Federalists claimed that the Constitution granted the Presi-
dent the power to decide to wage war against other nations. Nor did
anyone assert that the "declare war" power only granted Congress the
power to issue formal declarations of war. Finally, no one maintained
that congressional declarations would lack one of the principal and
universal features of a formal declaration, namely the command to
wage the war declared.
The same evidentiary pattern emerges when we look at early prac-
tice. The first four Presidents believed that they could not wage war
without a formal or informal declaration of war. President George
Washington noted that "[t] he Constitution vests the power of declar-
ing war with Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of impor-
tance can be undertaken" against the Creek Nation "until after
[Congress] shall have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized
such a measure. ' 4 7 Indeed, Washington said this after the Creek had
already declared war.48 Washington's understanding of his own con-
stitutional power is irreconcilable with the formalist theory. 49
His successors agreed. President John Adams went to Congress
even though he thought France was at war with the United States. 50
Thomas Jefferson always publicly claimed that he could not wage war
without a declaration, going so far as to seek authorization to wage
war against Tripoli after the latter had already declared war.51 Finally,
James Madison asked Congress for declarations of war against En-
45 See id. at 81-84.
46 Unleashing cites new evidence from, among others, James Madison, Rufus King,
Nathanial Gorham, and Robert Livingston. See id. at 86-88.
47 Letter from George Washington to Governor William Moultrie (Aug. 28, 1793), in
33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 73, 73 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
48 Prakash, supra note 3, at 97-98.
49 Making War argues that Washington ordered a war against the Wabash without con-
gressional authorization. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 158-62. But I agree with
Sofaer that Congress impliedly authorized the war. See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 122-23 (1976). In other words, Congress informally
declared war.
50 Prakash, supra note 3, at 101-02.
51 Id. at 103-05.
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gland and Algeria, regarding himself incompetent to wage war with-
out prior authorization.5 2
These were hardly idiosyncratic views. Alexander Hamilton,
Thomas Jefferson, Henry Knox, and many others agreed with these
early Presidents. 53 Hamilton, hardly associated with narrow readings
of presidential power, claimed that "it belongs to Congress only, to go
to war."5 4 Moreover, early constitutional commentators, from James
Kent to Joseph Story, believed that Congress could decide whether the
nation would wage war and that the President could not take the na-
tion to war.5 5
In contrast to the post-ratification evidence supporting the cate-
gorical theory, Making War cites no one who argued that the President
could decide to wage war and that Congress could only limit the Presi-
dent by defunding the war. Nor did anyone suggest that though Con-
gress could formally declare war, it could not command the military to
wage the war it declared. Abraham Sofaer's exceptional book first
mentions such arguments when discussing James Monroe's tenure.5 6
Those who spoke in favor of a presidential war power were roundly
condemned. 57
Making War correctly observes that one should not add up eviden-
tial chits for various meanings and then choose the meaning with the
most evidence merely because it has more. 58 Discerning original
meaning is not so mechanical. Yet perhaps we ought to eschew theo-
ries that have few or no chits as compared to theories that have many.
If so, we have good reason to doubt the formalist theory because it
lacks founding-era support.
The formalist theory even has a hard time reconciling the docu-
ments that one might suppose should trouble it the least: formal dec-
larations of war. Each of the nation's formal declarations granted
authority to the President to wage war. 59 For instance, the 1812 decla-
ration of war not only declared war, it also "authorized" the President
52 Id. at 105-06.
53 Id. at 97-107.
54 Alexander Hamilton, Examination ofJefferson's Message to Congress of December
7, 1801, No.l (Dec. 17, 1801), in 8 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 246, 249 (Henry
Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
55 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 92-93; see also JAMES KENT, DISSERTATIONS: BEING THE
PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LAw LECTURES 66 (New York, 1795) (noting that "war
can only be commenced by an act or resolution of [C]ongress").
56 See SOFAER, supra note 49, at 359 (quoting Representative Alexander Smyth).
57 See id. at 370-72.
58 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 1, at 125.
59 See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2062 (2005) (noting that all American formal declara-
tions of war authorized the President to use force).
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to use the military and the militia to wage the war.60 Moreover, most
formal declarations of war expressly directed the President to use mili-
tary force to wage war.6 1
Advocates of the formalist theory must regard all these formal
declarations as constitutionally dubious. Such declarations contained
language granting the authority to wage war under what the formalist
theory maintains is a false belief: that the President lacks such power
absent congressional authorization. Moreover, those declarations that
actually directed the President to wage war were certainly unconstitu-
tional because they commanded something that the formalist theory
claims is left to the President's utter discretion. Ironically, formalist
theory proponents must suppose that many of the nation's formal
declarations were unconstitutional because they too closely resembled
traditional formal declarations of war in that they authorized or or-
dered the use of force.
In sum, Making War asks the correct question: What does it mean
to "declare war"? When one focuses solely on international law trea-
tises that preceded the Constitution's creation, Professor Yoo's schol-
arship yields a rather plausible answer: to "declare war" was to issue a
formal declaration of war.
But if one delves deeper, one sees that the formalist theory suffers
two problems. First, the formalist theory unduly minimizes formal
declarations because it never admits that declarations ordered the use
of force. Given this universal feature of formal declarations, Congress
can command the use of force in its declarations, as it has done in the
past two centuries. Moreover, if the "declare war" power rests exclu-
sively with Congress, as the formalist theory admits, then Congress has
the sole power to authorize the use of force in war, just as it has the
sole power to create wartime commercial rules and invoke the laws of
war. In supposing that Congress can issue formal declarations of war
but cannot order the use of force, the formalist theory is at war with
itself.
Second, the formalist theory cannot account for the evidence re-
vealing a broader sense of "declare war," one that encompasses all
decisions to wage war, however expressed. Kings and Parliaments,
along with diplomats and scholars voiced the view that to wage war was
necessarily to declare it. More importantly, early Americans read the
60 Act of June 24, 1812, 2 Stat. 755 (obsolete) (declaring War between the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the dependencies thereof, and the United
States of America and their territories).
61 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364 (declaring war against Spain and
directing the President to use the military to wage war); Joint Resolution of Apr. 6, 1917,
ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1 (declaring war against Germany and directing the President to use the
military to wage war);Joint Resolution of Dec. 8, 1941, ch. 561, 55 Stat. 795 (declaring war
againstJapan and directing the President to use the military to wage war).
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"declare war" power consistent with the categorical theory's claims.
Those who considered the matter-including Presidents, Justices,
Congresses, legal scholars, and Framers-agreed that Congress could
decide to go to war and that the President could not. In the face of
this evidence, it could be that the Constitution incorporated the for-
malist theory, but it seems unlikely.
II
RESPONDING TO DECLARATIONS OF WAR
Professor Ramsey and I share more common ground. We agree
that when a nation began a war in the eighteenth century, it had de-
clared war no less than if it had made a formal declaration. 62 Because
only Congress could declare war, only Congress could make state-
ments or order actions that were regarded as declarations. Put an-
other way, we agree that only Congress can issue initiation
declarations of war. This was the central insight of Professor Ramsey's
excellent article, Textualism and War Powers (Textualism). 63 Unleashing
adds much evidence supporting that claim.
Yet we also have our differences. As a matter of original meaning,
we disagree about who could decide to wage war after another nation
had declared war against the United States and about whether it was
possible to declare war in response to another nation's declaration of
war. In Unleashing, I advance the categorical theory's claim that the
same hostile actions and words that constituted an initiation declara-
tion of war were declarations in the response context as well. 64 More-
over, some nations issued formal response declarations and others
were said to have informally declared war against the first war declar-
ant.65 Because the "declare war" power included the power to decide
to make war, Unleashing argues that even after another nation had de-
clared war, Congress had to declare war if the United States was to
wage it.66
In contrast, Professor Ramsey asserts in The President's Power to Re-
spond to Attacks (Power to Respond)67 that in the response context, the
"declare war" power is irrelevant, that declaring war is impossible, and
that the President may wage war at will. The following are the argu-
ments that lead to these conclusions, as I understand them: First, by
declaring war against the United States, by formal or informal means,
62 See Ramsey, supra note 2, at 169.
63 See Ramsey, supra note 3.
64 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 94-112.
65 See id. at 94-107.
66 See id. at 94-112.
67 See Ramsey, supra note 2.
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the declarant has ensured that both nations are in a state of war.6 8
Second, because the United States is in a state of war and is thus al-
ready at war, there can be no war for the United States to "declare."
Hence, the "declare war" power has no bearing in the response con-
text, and declarations of war are impossible. 69 Third, because declar-
ing war is not possible in the response context, Congress's "declare
war" power is not implicated and the President may wage war. In Un-
leashing, I label this set of claims "the pragmatic theory" because it
reasonably maintains that no response declaration is necessary to
wage war once another nation has declared war. Power to Respond is a
significant piece of scholarship because it stands as the most complete
explication and defense of the pragmatic theory.
Power to Respond lays great stress on the first claim that, once a
nation declared war on another, both nations were in a state of war.
Yet this was hardly obvious. Steven Neff s recent comprehensive his-
torical treatment of the law of war indicates that this position was con-
tested by theorists in the late-eighteenth century. 70 Indeed, during
the founding era, both the Netherlands and Portugal took the view
that they were not at war, despite declarations of war against them.7 1
More importantly, Presidents contradicted the state-of-war claim; both
John Adams and James Madison said that while nations were at war
with the United States, the United States was at peace with those na-
tions, presumably because Congress had not declared war. 72 In short,
what Power to Respond concludes is true as a matter of logic and history
was actually disputed quite a bit.
In any event, Professor Ramsey's second claim that one could not
"declare war" in response to another nation's declaration is the most
vital because while the Constitution says nothing about a "state of
war," it clearly states who has the power to "declare war." If, contrary
to the pragmatic theory, a nation could declare war, either formally or
informally, after another nation had declared war against it, then only
Congress enjoyed the power to issue this response declaration of war.
Moreover, if the President took any responsive action that would con-
stitute a formal or an informal declaration of war, such action would
have usurped Congress's "declare war" power.
Despite Professor Ramsey's assertions to the contrary, there is no
doubt that eighteenth-century nations made formal and informal re-
sponse declarations of war. First, numerous formal declarations of the
era were response declarations, issued in response to another nation's
68 See id. at 173-74, 190.
69 See id. at 190.
70 STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW oF NATIONS 142-47 (2005).
71 See id. at 145-47.
72 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 108-09.
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declaration.7 3 This pattern continues to this day, as the United States
has issued numerous formal response declarations over its history.7 4
Second, individuals from the eighteenth century regarded both na-
tions fighting a war as having declared war; no one distinguished be-
tween the first and second declarants. Indeed, Textualism itself cited
Admiral Horatio Nelson's claim that Napoli and France had both de-
clared war via their unconstrained warfare. 75  Similarly, Unleashing
cited John Adams's description of France and England as having de-
clared war via their general hostilities.76 Third, much of the evidence
from Textualism and Unleashing indicating that various hostile signals
were regarded as declarations of war consists of generic statements
that do not distinguish between the first and second declarant. None
of them support the distinction that Professor Ramsey tries to draw in
Power to Respond.77 For instance, when Robert Walpole claimed that
most recent declarations had been made via "the Mouths of Can-
nons," he never said that only the first nation to open fire declares
war.78 Fourth, the international-law scholars of the era discussed re-
73 Neff cites two such response declarations, but claims that the practice was not com-
mon. See NEFF, supra note 70, at 143-44. But a review of numerous response declarations
found in the multivolume sets reveals otherwise. See A GENERAL COLLECTION OF TREATYS,
DECLARATIONS OF WAR, MANIFESTOS, AND OTHER PUBLICK PAPERS, RELATING TO PEACE AND
WAR (London, 1710) [hereinafter A GENERAL COLLECTION]; NAVAL AND MILITARY MEMOIRS,
supra note 39. There are about a dozen formal response declarations found within these
volumes. See, e.g., 1 A GENERAL COLLECTION, supra, at 256, 259-60 (Netherlands declaring
war against France and noting that France had declared war first); id. at 272, 273 (Spain
declaring war against France and noting that France had declared war first); 3 NAVAL AND
MILITARY MEMOIRS, supra note 39, at 13 (Spain declaring war against England after noting
that England had declared war first); 3 id. at 45, 46 (England declaring war against France
after noting that France had declared war first). Other declarations cite hostilities as a
reason for declaring war. Given the prevailing sense that hostilities were declarations of
war, declarations that complained about the other nation's hostilities were response decla-
rations of war. See, e.g., 3 id. at 102 (England declaring war and complaining that France
had commenced war against England).
74 See Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9 (declaring war against Mexico and noting
that a state of war existed because of the "act of the Republic of Mexico"); Joint Resolution
of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 564, 55 Stat. 796 (declaring war against Germany and noting that
Germany had already formally declared war); Joint Resolution of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 565, 55
Stat. 797 (declaring war against Italy and noting that Italy had already formally declared
war); see also Prakash, supra note 3, at 97 (discussing the 1812 declaration against England).
75 See Ramsey, supra note 3, at 1596.
76 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 49.
77 In Power to Respond, Professor Ramsey claims that "Unleashing shows that declara-
tions of war were sometimes associated with the decision to resist." Ramsey, supra note 2, at
176. Yet in Unleashing, I never showed that mere "decisions to resist" were viewed as decla-
rations. Instead, I reveal that decisions to wage war, made in whatever context, were seen
as declarations. Indeed, no one described the fending off of an attack, without more, as a
declaration of war. Instead, individuals reserved that label for large-scale hostilities that
made clear that the victim of the initial declaration had chosen to declare war.
78 Prakash, supra note 3, at 48-49.
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sponse declarations of war without ever suggesting that they were
impossible. 79
In the face of this usage, Power to Respond itself offers no contrary
evidence. It cites no government, diplomat, or scholar from the
founding era (or otherwise) who claimed that a nation simply does
not "declare war" when it either issues a formal response declaration
of war or decides to wage war in response to a previous declaration of
war.
What leads Power to Respond to adopt an argument that runs
counter to the evidence? Power to Respond assumes that the "declare
war" power only grants Congress the ability to create a state of war.80
This is a mistake. The clause enables Congress to issue declarations of
war, and declarations could accomplish far more than merely creating
a state of war.
Contrary to Professor Ramsey's crucial claim, there clearly was
something to "declare" in the aftermath of another nation's declara-
tion of war. First and foremost, the victimized nation could "declare"
whether it would wage war in response. The decision to fight a war
was not an obvious choice by any means, as many nations chose not to
wage war and instead pursued other options, such as peace negotia-
tions or purely defensive measures.8' The United States declined to
wage war in response to formal and informal declarations in its early
years. Famously, the United States chose to pay tribute to several Bar-
bary states rather than fight them.8 2 Less famously, Congress chose
not to declare war against the Creek and Cherokee, and instead em-
ployed defensive measures to safeguard territory and settlers. 83
Second, declarations, whether formal or informal, commanded
the use of force-something that must occur if a nation is to wage
war.84 As noted earlier, these were universal features of formal decla-
rations. Third, formal declarations could serve many other war-re-
lated functions, such as declaring the wartime rights of enemy
nationals and citizens, and declaring the continued status of treaties. 85
Thus, even if it were clear that response declarations could not create
a state of war because an initiation declaration had already ushered in
that state, it still would not follow that response declarations were im-
79 See id. at 110-11.
80 Ramsey, supra note 2, at 191-92.
81 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 66, 111-12. By not mentioning the many other alterna-
tives to waging war discussed in Unleashing, Professor Ramsey mistakenly suggests that I
posit that a nation must surrender if it does not fight. See Ramsey, supra note 2, at 171, 190.
82 Prakash, supra note 3, at 110.
83 See id. at 100-01.
84 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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possible. Response declarations could declare quite a bit even if we
assume that they could not create a state of war.86
Consistent with these claims, formal response declarations of war
sometimes had an additional or different locution. Occasionally they
declared that a state of war existed by virtue of the enemy's initial
declaration. 87 They then went on to command military force, make
wartime rules, propagandize against the enemy, etc. This usage per-
haps supports the pragmatic theory's first claim, but only at the cost of
defeating its second and more vital claim. That some nations issued
declarations of war stating that they were already at war fairly proves
that nations could declare war even if they regarded themselves as
already in a state of war.
In any event, for originalists of all stripes, usage determines the
meaning of words. Despite making an originalist argument, Power to
Respond never explains why it rejects the undisputed and clear usage
of "declare war" and "declaration of war." Power to Respond's refusal to
square its textual claims with actual usage is one of its shortcomings. 8
86 Although Power to Respond does not discuss the many other functions of a declara-
tion of war, Professor Ramsey recognized in his prior work that declarations did more than
create a state of war. See Ramsey, supra note 3, at 1586-87.
87 See Act of June 18, 1812, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755 (declaring that war existed between
America and England); see also French Declaration of War against England and Holland, in
THE CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF
FRANCE, 1789-1901, at 148, 151 (Frank Malloy Anderson ed., 1904) (noting that France "is
at war" with England and Holland because the latter two informally declared war on
France).
88 In a bid to cast doubt on this incontrovertible usage, Professor Ramsey tries to
make hay with my claim that nations that merely defended themselves had not declared
war, while nations that embarked on offensive measures had declared war. See Ramsey,
supra note 2, at 173. In Unleashing, I assert that the former was not a declaration of war
because it did not signal that the nation ordering such force had decided to wage war
generally. The latter-offensive measures-was a declaration because it indicated a deci-
sion to wage war, or so I argue. See Prakash, supra note 3, at 117-19. Consistent with this
argument, both Washington and Jefferson repeatedly claimed that, while the President
could order defensive measures, he could not order offensive measures because that would
usurp the congressional power to declare war. See id. at 97-99, 103-05. Moreover, Neffs
discussion of Portugal and the Netherlands suggests the same dividing line, for the latter
certainly defended themselves against English attack even while insisting that they were not
at war with England. See NEFF, supra note 70, at 145-47.
In Power to Respond, Professor Ramsey's attempted haymaking starts with an area of
obvious agreement. All agree that not every use of force was a declaration of war. He then
argues that because this is true and because (in his view) no one distinguished offensive
from defensive operations, it somehow follows that no one could have thought that deci-
sions to wage war made in the response context were declarations of war at all. See Ramsey,
supra note 2, at 173-76.
Apart from the fact that the last claim flies in the face of actual usage, the argument is
unsound. If we assume that (a) everyone agreed that certain uses of force in the response
context were not declarations of war, (b) everyone agreed that other, more vigorous uses
of force were declarations of war, and (c) (counterfactually) no one discussed the dividing
line between these uses of force, then we face the difficult task of reconstructing the divid-
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Turning to history, I argue in Unleashing that even though nations
had declared war on the United States in formal and informal ways,
Presidents Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison believed that
the President could not wage war in response. These Presidents un-
derstood that if the nation was to wage war, Congress would have to
declare war, even when another nation already had declared war
against the United States.8 9
Consider the Washington Administration, the most crucial ad-
ministration because it was closest in time to the Constitution's crea-
tion and because its views best reflect the Constitution's original
meaning.90 In Power to Respond, Professor Ramsey seems to admit that
the Creek and Cherokee nations declared war against the United
States.9 ' Further, he admits that the Washington Administration felt
constitutionally limited to defensive measures precisely because Con-
gress had not declared war.92 Rather than accepting the explanations
that officials offered in almost a dozen letters (that notwithstanding
the declarations of war, the President could not sanction offensive
measures), Professor Ramsey asserts that these Indian nations were not
ing line.. The undoubted difficulty in discerning the dividing line does notjustify rejecting
evidence that proves that response declarations were common.
In any event, Professor Ramsey fails to realize in Power to Respond that his argument, if
taken seriously, applies equally to Textualism's claim about informal initiation declarations
of war. Recall that in Textualism, Professor Ramsey argued that certain large-scale uses of
force were initiation declarations of war because they signaled a decision to wage war. See
Ramsey, supra note 3, at 1632. At the same time, in Textualism, he admits that not all initial
uses of force were declarations of war. See id. at 1632-33. A cannonball fired by one na-
tion's vessel upon another nation's vessel, without more, was surely not an informal decla-
ration of war. Nor was a wayward bullet that happened to cross the border. Despite clarity
at these extremes of the continuum, we cannot determine exactly what quantum of force
was necessary to say that a nation had crossed the threshold and moved from a
nondeclaratory use of military force to an informal initiation declaration of war. Indeed,
neither Textualism nor Power to Respond offers any such threshold or "show[s] any cases
where [initiation] declarations of war were associated with" raising the level of force from
one level to another. See Ramsey, supra note 2, at 176.
Notwithstanding this evidentiary hole, Professor Ramsey confidently argues in Textual-
ism that some level of force was sufficient to make clear that a nation had issued an initiation
declaration of war. See Ramsey, supra note 3, at 1546. He reaches this conclusion by dem-
onstrating, as do I in Unleashing, that numerous individuals said that a decision to wage war
was a declaration of war. Professor Ramsey evinces no concern in Textualism about his
failure to unearth evidence relevant to discerning the level of military force that distin-
guishes mere uses of force from initiation declarations.
What is true for initiation declarations holds equally true for response declarations.
My alleged failure to show that "shifting from defense to offense" was a response declara-
tion of war matters not a whit more than Professor Ramsey's failure in Textualism to show
that shifting from one level of force to another was an initiation declaration of war.
89 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 97-107.
90 See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Af-
fairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 295-96 (2001).
91 See Ramsey, supra note 2, at 177.
92 See id.
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at warwith the United States. 93 Relatedly, he claims that the Adminis-
tration did not "fully support" the characterization that the Indian na-
tions had declared war.94
These assertions are mistaken. Washington himself spoke of the
"predatory war" conducted by the southern Indians.9 5  Similarly,
Thomas Jefferson referred to the Creek's actions as "wanton and un-
provoked war, '" 6 an "unequivocal war,"'9 7 and an "invasion.' ' " Moreo-
ver, several letters explicitly referenced the declarations without any
hint that reports of the declarations were false.'19 Finally, Creek and
Cherokee peace treaties made clear that the tribes were previously at
war with the United States (and thus had declared war).1 0 Contrary
to the picture painted by Power to Respond, the Washington Administra-
tion took the declarations quite seriously, responding by ordering out
the militia, warning governors, and seeking congressional authority
for offensive measures.'10
More importantly, Washington and his cabinet endorsed the view
that only Congress could decide to wage war even after another na-
tion had declared war. Immediately after receiving news that the
Cherokee had formally declared war, cabinet members Henry Knox,
Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton concluded that the Presi-
dent could do no more than order defensive measures. 0 2 Offensive
91 See id. at 177-79.
94 Id. at 177.
95 Letter from George Washington to Timothy Pickering (Mar. 10, 1795), in 11 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 18, 18 Oared Sparks ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.
1855); see also Letter from George Washington to John Sinclair (Feb. 20, 1796), in 2 THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, BART. 22, 22 (London,
Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley 1831) (noting that there were expenses related to the
Indian "wars").
96 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael and William Short (June 30,
1793), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 148, 155 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
97 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael and William Short (May 31,
1793), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 96, at 101, 103.
98 Letter from ThomasJefferson to James Madison (June 2, 1793), in 9 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 96, at 105, 106.
99 People were uncertain about whether hostilities would continue, not whether the
Indian nations had declared war. Note that the letters quoted in Power to Respond point out
that there had been no recent hostilities at the time the letters were written. Ramsey, supra
note 2, at 178 (quoting Letter from Henry Knox to Edward Telfair (Sept. 5, 1793), in 4
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 365, 365 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair
Clarke eds., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1832); Letter from Edward Telfair to Henry Knox (July
24, 1793), in 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra, at 370, 370. But that is
irrelevant under the pragmatic theory. When a nation declares war, as the Creek did in
1793, it does not matter whether any hostilities follow because the declaration supposedly
creates a state of war, rendering the "declare war" power irrelevant.
100 See Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, U.S.-Cherokee, June 26, 1794, 7 Stat. 43 (dis-
cussing the desire to "re-establish[ ] peace"); Treaty with the Creeks, U.S.-Creek, June 29,
1796, 7 Stat. 56 (describing the treat)' as a peace treaty).
101 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 97-101.
102 See id. at 98-99.
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measures would have to be approved by Congress precisely because
Congress had the "powers of war."' °3 The cabinet reached these con-
stitutional conclusions in a document evincing absolutely no doubts
about whether the Cherokee had declared war.' 0 4 Furthermore, Sec-
retary of War Knox's letters to governors referencing the Cherokee
declaration of war noted that only defensive measures were appropri-
ate and forbade offensive measures because Congress had the "de-
clare war" power. 10 5  None of these letters suggested that the
Cherokee had not declared war. To the contrary, Knox noted that the
"details transmitted di[id] not admit of the least doubt of the authen-
ticity" of the news that certain Cherokee tribes had declared war. 10 6
The President evidently concurred with his cabinet's conclusions
because he approved of the explanation that went to the governors. 10 7
Indeed, Washington himself told the governors that only defensive
measures were appropriate because Congress had the "declare war"
power.' 08 Importantly, Washington reached these conclusions while
believing that the Indian nations were at war against the United
States.109
Finally, Knox wrote one letter that stands out because it directly
contradicts the pragmatic theory. Knox wrote that if "war actually
exists," nothing more than defensive measures could be implemented;
if "more extensive measures" were necessary, Congress would have to
approve."t 0 Clearly the Secretary of War did not imagine that the
President had carte blanche to wage war merely because another na-
tion had begun it.
Power to Respond has similar difficulties making sense of the consti-
tutional views of Presidents John Adams and James Madison. In 1798,
103 Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (Oct. 9, 1792), in 11 PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 212, 212 (Philander Chase & Christine Sternberg Patrick eds., 2002).
104 Id.
105 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 100-01.
106 Letter from Secretary of War to the Governor of Virginia (Oct. 9, 1792), in 4 AMERI-
CAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 99, at 261, 261.
As Unleashing discusses, Knox wrote similar letters in the aftermath of the Creek decla-
ration of war, none of which suggests that the Creeks had not declared war. See Prakash,
supra note 3, at 100-01 (quoting Letter from Henry Knox to William Telfair (Sept. 5,
1793), in 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 99, at 365, 365).
107 Knox had given Governor Blount's letter to the President, apparently with the idea
that the President would instruct Knox as to what response to give. Indeed, Knox's letter
to Blount noted that Washington might have to convey further directions, indicating that
Knox's letter reflected Washington's views. See Letter from Secretary of War to Governor
Blount (Oct. 9, 1792), in 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 99, at 261,
261.
108 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 98, 100.
109 See supra text accompanying note 95.
110 Letter of Henry Knox to Governor William Blount (May 14, 1793), in 4 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 99, at 429, 429.
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Adams concluded that France was "at war" with the United States.Il"
Despite his view that France had declared war against the United
States, "1 2 Adams viewed his constitutional authority as limited. He did
not consider himself at liberty to wage war merely because France was
making war on the United States. Regarding the events preceding the
1812 declaration of war, Power to Respond denies that England had
waged war by illegally seizing American ships and by impressing Amer-
icans. 1  But what should matter under the pragmatic theory is how
the President regarded these actions. In his address to Congress re-
questing a declaration, Madison said that Britain was in a "state of
war" with the United States. 1 4 Finally, even though Algeria declared
war on the United States in 1812," 15 Madison felt constrained to go to
Congress in 1815 to wage war against Algeria.' 16 Congress obliged,
noting that the Dey of Algiers had "commenced a predatory warfare,"
I I I ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UN-
DECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 23 (1966). Abigail Adams also thought that France had been
waging war against the United States for months before Congress declared a limited naval
war. SeeJOHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE 356 (1992). Finally, one should note that
Hamilton advised James McHenry about Adams's limited constitutional powers, see
Prakash, supra note 3, at 102, within a month after Hamilton wrote that "[t]he despots of
France are waging war against us," see Titus Manlius, The Stand, N.Y. COMMERCIAL ADVER-
TISER, reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 54, at 259, 265.
Power to Respond cites leading modern historians and the French government's beliefs
about whether France was at war with the United States. See Ramsey, supra note 2, at 183
n.58. Moreover, Power to Respond asserts that debates in Congress "reflected an understand-
ing" that France was at peace with the United States. Id. at 183.
The former point is irrelevant because what matters under the pragmatic theory is not
what France thought or what modern historians say but what President Adams thought.
On the latter claim, Professor Ramsey is mistaken in supposing a general understanding.
There clearly were some who agreed with President Adams, his wife, and Hamilton. See,
e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1327 (1851) (noting Representative Samuel Sewall's statement that
the present situation "ought to be considered as a state of war, not declared by us, but
against us, by the French Republic"); id. at 1321 (noting Representative Abraham Bald-
win's comment that "some persons declare that the present state of things is already a state
of war"). Shortly before enacting statutes pushing the United States into war, some repre-
sentatives favored stating that there was a state of war between the United States and
France. See DECONDE, supra, at 105. One representative, Robert Goodloe Harper, said,
"War is made upon us." Id.
112 Both Power to Respond and Unleashing take the view that in the initiation context, a
nation could only have been at war with another nation if the first nation had declared
war, either formally or informally. Accordingly, Adams's belief that France was at war with
the United States necessarily implies that France had informally declared war. See Prakash,
supra note 3, at 102-03.
1 1-4 See Ramsey, supra note 2, at 181-84.
114 Prakash, supra note 3, at 105. Consistent with Madison's view, a congressional com-
mittee noted that England had declared war. Id.
115 2 THEODORE LYMAN,JR., THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES 369 (2d ed., Boston,
Wells & Lilly 1828).
116 See Prakash, supra note 3, at 106.
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and authorized the President to wage a naval war.' 17 Under the prag-
matic theory, the actions and views of Adams and Madison (and their
respective Congresses) are inexplicable.
Discussing the Jefferson Administration's response to Tripoli's
declaration of war, Power to Respond emphasizes the cabinet discussion
and the orders issued to naval commanders."I8 This is the first epi-
sode from the founding era that provides some support for the prag-
matic theory.' 19
Nonetheless, consider what transpired in full public view.121 Ac-
cording to the pragmatic theory, Jefferson could have waged war with-
out any congressional statute. Yet Jefferson sought congressional
authority to wage war. 1 21 Moreover, Congress actually granted author-
ity to "commit acts of hostility" against Tripoli. 122 If the pragmatic
theory held sway within Congress, members ought to have told Jeffer-
son that the Constitution already granted him the authority he re-
quested. The pragmatic theory cannot account for Jefferson's
expressed view and the collective view of Congress that the Com-
mander in Chief did not have the constitutional authority to wage war
merely because Tripoli had declared war. 123 Jefferson was fight to
suppose that he could not order offensive measures against Tripoli
without a congressional declaration of war.
In sum, Professor Ramsey cannot square his claims about the im-
possibility of response declaration of war and the irrelevance of the
117 Following Congress's declaration, Madison sent a letter to the Dey noting that Alge-
ria had declared war first. See Letter from James Madison to the Dey of Algiers (Apr. 12,
1815), in 2 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 115, at 373, 373.
118 See Ramsey, supra note 2, at 184-85. Power to Respond also cites Hamilton's The Ex-
amination, in which Hamilton, writing as Lucius Crassus, criticizes Jefferson's claims about
the "declare war" power. See id. at 187.
119 In Unleashing, I discuss this cabinet opinion, including some details that offer a
more nuanced picture of the cabinet discussions. See Prakash, supra note 3, at 107 n.334
(discussing notes from the cabinet meeting). I also discuss how Alexander Hamilton's
pointed criticisms of Jefferson are inconsistent with his prior writings and the advice he
gave Washington and the Adams Administration. See id. at 109-10.
120 See id. at 103-04.
121 See id.
122 Id.
123 The view of the 1802 Congress was hardly isolated, ;3 it was also reflected in the
1812 and 1815 declarations of war against England and Algeria. Moreover, individual
members of Congress also voiced this view. See, e.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 737 (1855) (noting
the comments of Representative Dayton that if war should break out during congressional
recess, it would make sense for the President to have the power to increase the size of the
Army so that the Army would be "prepared to act the moment that hostilities should be
declared by the constituted authority"). This comment assumes that Congress must de-
clare war even after another nation has begun waging war. See also 8 ANNALS OF CONG.
2117 (1851) (noting the comments of Representative Sitgreaves that the country is in a
state of war, but also arguing that "it is only competent for Congress to declare the country
in war; therefore, until that declaration is made by this department, the Executive and
judiciary cannot act in the same way as if the country was at war").
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"declare war" power in the response context with the practices of the
first four administrations. Nations declared war numerous times, ei-
ther formally or informally, against the United States. Yet in none of
these cases did Presidents argue or claim that they had a free hand to
fight these nations merely because the United States was the victim of
a declaration of war. To the contrary, Presidents consistently went to
Congress for the authority to wage war even after another nation had
declared war against the United States. When Congress declared war,
either formally or informally, Presidents then fought the war author-
ized by Congress. But when Congress did not authorize a war, as it
did not do with respect to the Creeks and Cherokees or for three years
after the Algerian declaration of war, Presidents understood that they
could net wage war. In those situations, Commanders in Chief real-
ized that they were limited to those steps falling short of a declaration
of war, such as defensive measures. If the pragmatic theory is right,
we must conclude that Presidents Washington, Adams, Jefferson,
Madison, and several Congresses were quite mistaken in their consti-
tutional beliefs. ' 24
The pragmatic theory's textual and historical assertions yield
three interesting ramifications worth highlighting. First, the prag-
matic theory suggests that the nation's formal-response declarations of
war were unconstitutional because no declaration was possible. Like-
wise, the provisions authorizing the President to wage war-part of
every formal-response declaration of war-were based on a flawed
reading of the Constitution, for no congressional authority to wage
war was necessary. Furthermore, from the pragmatic theory's claims,
it necessarily follows that the nation did not declare war againstJapan,
Germany, Italy, etc. because it was definitionally impossible for the
United States to "declare war" after those nations had declared war
first.
Second, the pragmatic theory suggests that because Congress has
no power to issue response declarations of war, the President may ex-
ercise all the functions traditionally associated with declarations of war
in the response context. While Congress can notify, propagandize,
and announce the rights of enemy nationals in an initiation declara-
124 Power to Respond also discusses the Monroe Administration and claims that after the
Seminole had waged war against the United States, Monroe fought a war without congres-
sional authorization. See Ramsey, supra note 2, at 188-89. I disagree with Professor Ram-
sey's conclusion that Congress had not authorized action against the Seminoles. Rather, I
agree with Sofaer that appropriations authorized the warfare. See SOFAER, supra note 49, at
360, 362-63, 377. If this explanation is correct, it too supports the view that even after
another nation declares war on the United States, Congress must formally or informally
declare war if the nation is to fight a war. Whether the declaration comes in a joint resolu-
tion with language expressly declaring war or in an appropriation informally declaring war
does not matter.
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tion of war, the pragmatic theory supposes that Congress lacks these
rights in the response context because it cannot declare war. Because
the President has all those Executive powers that Congress lacks, it
follows that the President can exercise all the subsidiary "declare war"
powers in the response context. Moreover, in the response context,
the Constitution actually permits the President to issue a document
falsely styled as a "declaration of war" because true declarations of war
are impossible in that context. Thus, even if the President purports to
declare war, such statements and actions cannot impinge on Con-
gress's allegedly nonexistent power to declare war responsively.
Third, Power to Respond's attempts to narrow the scope of informal
declarations have unacknowledged consequences for presidential
power. Under the pragmatic theory, any use of military force that is
not a declaration rests with the President as part of his executive
power. But if invasions of territory (Creek), illegal capture of neutral
shipping not carrying enemy contraband (England and France), and
the kidnapping of thousands of foreign sailors (England) are not im-
plied declarations of limited war when undertaken by other na-
tions, 125 then the President likewise can order these uses of military
force because it is not a declaration of war to do so. Indeed, the Presi-
dent may order every use of force that Power to Respond claims was not
an implied declaration of war. One is left to wonder precisely what
the President cannot do that would amount to a declaration of war.
All told, one might say that the pragmatic theory has three defi-
ciencies. First, the theory is inconsistent. When starting a war, a deci-
sion to wage war is a declaration of war. Hence, marching troops
across the border toward the enemy capital is an obvious declaration
of war. But when deciding to wage war against another nation that
has declared war first, marching troops across the same border toward
the same capital is no longer a declaration of war. This claim is
counterintuitive and unsupported.
Second, though the pragmatic theory insists that one cannot de-
clare war in the response context, it never cites anyone who says as
much. Thus, despite the many response declarations of war in the
eighteenth century and the numerous scholars, diplomats, and execu-
tives who discuss them, the pragmatic theory leaves us with the bare
assertion that it was definitionally impossible to issue a response decla-
ration of war. If usage determines meaning, something is seriously
amiss with the pragmatic theory.
Finally, the pragmatic theory cannot reconcile its claims with
early American statements and practices. When another nation de-
clared war, Presidents consistently went to Congress for authority to
125 See Ramsey, supra note 2, at 177-84.
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fight the war. They explained that they lacked the authority to order
offensive operations because only Congress had the power to declare
war. Moreover, Congress agreed with these constitutional views.
Sometimes, Congress authorized Presidents to wage war in the re-
sponse context. When Congress demurred, however, Presidents un-
derstood that they could order only defensive measures. Contrary to
Power to Responds central claim, early Presidents and Congresses re-
peatedly acted as if Presidents had no respond power to wage war.
CONCLUSION
Every legal scholar hopes that his or her scholarship will finally
resolve something like a legal mystery or long-festering dispute. Real-
ity is always less gratifying. Still, we labor on. Maybe we do so with the
hope that those who consider the subject in the future will grapple
with arguments and evidence found in our work. Whatever one may
think of the arguments found in Unleashing and its admirable prede-
cessors, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means and Textualism and
War Powers, I can think of no better place to start to discern the origi-
nal meaning of "declare war" than those works and the provocative
responses they have inspired.
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